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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the rapid rise of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) showed the fragility of the banking system and the lack of harmonized 
regulatory regime to address the systemic risk of failing banks. The deterioration of 
NPLs in the balance sheet of credit institutions represents a real concern for the 
supervisory authorities and constitutes a challenge for regulators and market actors. 
This chapter examines the supervision of NPLs taking into consideration the 
architecture of Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the role of European Central 
Bank (ECB) to monitor non-performing exposures. The new supervisory toolkit 
implemented in the European Banking Union aims to improve the classification of asset 
quality and to establish common practices to resolve NPLs. This chapter argues that the 
intricate structure of the preventive measures to reduce the risk of lending defines a new 
landscape in the prudential treatment of NPLs.  
 
Keywords: Non-performing loans, asset quality, prudential regime, non-performing 
exposures, write-off, bank capital, resolution and restructuring mechanism, credit risk. 
 
1. Introduction  
The creation of the European Banking Union (hereinafter the ‘EBU’) with the 
granting of supervisory powers to the European Central Bank (ECB)1 and the increased 
attention given by regulators to non-performing loans (NPLs) are some of the 
developments that in the aftermath of the global financial crisis have brought the issue 
of financial stability back to the fore of legal and economic policy debate. The Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) put the ECB directly in charge as the supervisor for the 
                     
1 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has been established by Council Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L 287. 
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largest Eurozone banking groups.2 This means that the dominant part of the Eurozone’s 
banking system is monitored by a common EU institution. As noted, ‘the underlying 
economic rationale is that full coordination via centralization of banks’ prudential 
supervision in the [SSM] and resolution in the SRM would result in the highest level of 
safety and soundness because only this approach allows for full internalization of 
potential negatives externalities of cross border banking’.3 The ECB also has the right to 
inspect smaller Eurozone banks that it does not supervise directly. In substance, the 
ECB is the direct supervisor of the significant banks for the entire Eurozone banking 
system.4  
During the global financial crisis, the banking sector experienced a rapid rise in loan 
delinquencies and defaults driven by the limitations of the Basel rules and the adequacy 
of capital.5 The crisis revealed that NPLs played a central role in the linkages between 
credit markets frictions and macroeconomic vulnerabilities.6 Espinoza and Prasad have 
observed that ‘in 2009 NPLs increased sharply and credit stagnated, raising worries that 
the recovery could be slowed down by credit constraints’.7 The regulatory treatment to 
assess the asset quality highlights the lack of common practices to monitor NPLs and 
the fragility of the banking institutions. Specifically there is no consensus on the 
definition and classification of NPLs across countries, firms or even within firms –
different data definitions are dependent on subsidiary and business line.8  
                     
2 The SSM is composed of the ECB and the national competent authorities, with the ECB in charge of 
its effective and consistent functioning (Article 6(1)). The scope of application of the SSM Regulation 
comprises all euro area Member States on a compulsory basis and also non-euro area Member States 
that voluntarily enter into a ‘close cooperation’ with the ECB (Article 7). The SSM Regulation confers 
‘specific tasks’ related to the prudential supervision of credit institutions to the ECB. 
3 See Maria Nieto and Larry D. Wall, ‘Cross-Border Banking on the Two Sides of the Atlantic: Does it 
Have an Impact on Bank Crisis Management?’, (2015), FRB Atlanta Working Paper, 17. 
4 See Eilís Ferran & Valia Babis, ‘The European Single Supervisory Mechanism’, (2013), 13 Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies, 255. It is noted that ‘designing the SSM has been an exercise in 
sophisticated legal gymnastics to fit within the existing Treaty framework, as well as high stakes 
political manoeuvring and pragmatic decision-making’.  
5 See Tara Sullivan and James Vickery, ‘A Look at Bank Loan Performance’, (2013), Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. It is pointed out that at the start of 2007, only about 1 percent of bank loan 
balances were “nonperforming”, meaning that the loan was at least ninety days past due or in 
nonaccrual status. By late 2015, however, the average level of NPLs across the EU banks is 5.9 percent 
while NPL ratios for the United States and Japan is less than 2 percent. See also World Bank, ‘Bank 
nonperforming loans to total gross loans’ available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS.  
6 See Mwanza Nkusu, ‘Nonperforming Loans and Macrofinancial Vulnerabilities in Advanced 
Economies’, (2011), IMF Working Paper, 4. The author observed a negative correlation between NPLs 
and various macroeconomic variables. 
7 See Raphael Espinoza & Ananthakrishnan Prasad, ‘Nonperforming Loans in the GCC Banking 
System and their Macroeconomic Effects’, (2010), IMF Working Paper, 4.  
8 See David Bholat et al, ‘Non-performing loans: regulatory and accounting treatment of assets’, 
(2016), Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 594, 3. It is argued that although NPL is generally 
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In the aftermath of the crisis, it has been suggested that provisioning be more 
forward-looking and that, in retrospect, had credit events been recognized before they 
occurred, might have made banks better prepared for losses when they were realized.9 
However, the inherent pro-cyclicality of loan performance expectations by banks would 
probably have meant that credit institutions would have underestimated risk of 
instability. The current regulatory approach to NPLs definition gives firms a high 
degree of discretion and the practical implementation of rules depends much on 
effective enforcement.10 In terms of prudential regime of NPLs, the main problem is 
the lack of a harmonized framework to assess the obligors’ ability to repay and whether 
it has become non-performing.11 Various factors affect the assessment of asset quality, 
namely (1) whether collateral, guarantees and other forms of security are factored into 
the asset quality classification; (2) whether the full outstanding value or only part of a 
loan is reported as non-performing; and (3) how to treat restructured loans.12  
While policy makers and legislators in recent years focused in creating a standard 
classification of sources of banks’ funding (i.e. equity and debt), scant attention has 
been given to creating a common identification of the asset quality. This chapter 
examines the supervision of NPLs taking into consideration the architecture of SSM and 
the role of ECB to manage and address the risks of unexpected deterioration of asset 
quality. The new supervisory tools introduced in the EBU aim to reduce the risk of 
failure of NPLs that can produce a serious impact in failing financial institutions. This 
chapter argues that the toolkit of supervisory measures established by the ECB - such as 
the provisioning backstop for deteriorated exposures - represents the new landscape of 
NPLs prudential regime.  
The next section discusses the normative framework of NPLs in light of the recent 
initiatives adopted at the international level to resolve the negative impact on lending to 
the banking sector. Section three analyses the architecture of SSM and the role of ECB 
                     
defined as a loan that is more than 90 days past due, different definitions remain among central banks 
and credit institutions. 
9 See Samuel Knott, Peter Richardson, Katie Rismanchi and Kallol Sen, ‘Understanding the fair value 
of banks’ loans’, (2014), Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 31, 7, available at 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-paper/2014/understanding-the-
fair-value-of-banks-loans. 
10 Regulators are primarily concerned to think about NPLs in comparison (as a ratio) of loan loss 
reserves/capital (the ‘Texas ratio’). 
11 See David Bholat et al, ‘Non-performing loans at the dawn of IFRS 9: regulatory and accounting 
treatment of asset quality’, (2017), 18 Journal of Banking Regulation, 33-4. 
12 See Bholat et al, supra note 8. 
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in relation to the NPLs issue taking into account the new regulatory mechanisms to 
monitor the classification of non-performing exposures (NPEs). Section four focuses on 
the supervisory actions of European Banking Authority (EBA) and the developments of 
accounting standard. Section five is devoted to examine the resolution and restructuring 
options for NPLs recovery. In this context, the objectives of reducing the intervention of 
public authorities and European financial institutions in failing banks constitute a 
challenge for regulators and market actors. The last section provides some conclusive 
observations. 
 
2. The regulatory definition of NPLs  
The definition of bank capital under Basel rules has marked a notable achievement 
in the assessment of loan quality although less attention has been made on harmonizing 
the classification of asset in the balance sheet.13 The lack of a common level playing 
field for NPLs makes meaningful comparison of banks’ assets difficult for investors and 
regulators. The UN System of National Accounts provides a global statistical definition 
of NPLs as “a loan is non-performing when payments of interest or principal are past 
due by 90 days or more, or interest payments equal to 90 days or more have been 
capitalized, refinanced, or delayed by agreement, or payments are less than 90 days 
overdue, but there are other good reasons (such as a debtor filing for bankruptcy) to 
doubt that payments will be made in full”.14  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published guidelines in 
evaluating credit risk for regulatory purposes.15 Under the Basel II capital framework, 
the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach required credit firms to provide own 
estimations of probability of default, loss given default and exposure at default.16 
Default is defined as where an obligor is 90 days past due, or is unlikely to pay its credit 
                     
13 The definition of capital was first harmonized under the Basel I Accord of 1988 through a soft law 
instrument. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Report on International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’, (1988), available at 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf. 
14 See United Nations, United Nations System of National Accounts, (2008), available at 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna2008.asp. However the UN statistical definition of a 
non-performing loan leaves scope for firm discretion since the meaning of certain terms such as 
“objective evidence of impairment” are not precisely defined. 
15 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Sound Practices for Loan Accounting and 
Disclosure’, (1999), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Paper, 35, para 91. 
16 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards’, (2004), Revised Framework. 
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obligations to the banking group in full, without recourse by the bank to actions such as 
realizing security. In 2006 the BCBS issued guidance that mentioned loan classification 
recommending banks to implement asset quality system on the basis of credit risk.17 
Recently the BCBS provided guidelines on prudential treatment of problem assets 
aiming to set a common definition for the terms ‘non-performing loan’ and 
‘forbearance’.18 The definition in this document applies to all credit exposures from on-
balance sheet loans, including debt securities, and off-balance sheet items, such as loan 
commitments and financial guarantees. The classification of non-performing developed 
for this purpose combines three existing concepts. Firstly, all exposures defined as in 
default under the Basel definition are considered non-performing. Secondly, exposures 
determined to be impaired for accounting purposes are defined as non-performing. 
Thirdly, loans that are past due by 90 days or where it is determined that full repayment 
is unlikely19 are also considered non-performing.  
The BCBS clarifies that collateralization does not influence past due status and 
should not be considered in the categorization of NPEs.20 In addition, forbearance is 
defined as “a concession granted by a bank to a counterparty for reasons of financial 
difficulties that would not be otherwise considered by the lender”.21 Basically 
forbearance comprises concessions extended to any exposures in the form of a loan, a 
debt security or an off-balance-sheet item due to the position of the counterparty. This 
definition covers exposures of performing and non-performing status before the 
granting of forbearance measures. The main purpose is to ensure a common approach to 
                     
17 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Sound credit risk assessment and valuation for 
loans’, (2006), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs126.pdf. In a further Consultative Document 
issued in December 2014 on revisions to the standardized approach for credit risk, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision suggested a definition of non-performing, whose threshold 
includes (amongst other criteria) 90 days past due for loans, and 30 days past due for securities. The 
purpose of these criteria is to calculate a ‘Non-Performing Asset’ (NPA) ratio when assessing 
exposures to other banks. At the time of issue, the proposals in this consultation were described by the 
BCBS as “at an early stage of development”. 
18 These new definitions are intended to complement existing accounting and regulatory measures, and 
as reference points to promote comparability. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
‘Prudential treatment of problem assets – definitions of non-performing exposures and forbearance’, 
(2017), Guidelines, available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d403.htm.  
19 This is similar to the definition developed by the EBA, Final draft implementing technical standards 
(ITS) on supervisory reporting on forbearance and non performing exposures under Article 99(4) of 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, EBA/ITS/2013/03/rev1. 
20 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision also notes that non-performing status should be 
applied at the level of the counterparty in the case of exposures to a non-retail counterparty, and at the 
level of each exposure in the case of exposures to a retail counterparty. 
21 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 18, 7. 
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the disclosure of modified loans and debt securities due to the case of borrower’s 
financial difficulties.22 
NPLs have become a recurrent phenomenon in some financial institutions and have 
dragged on economic activity, especially for countries that rely mainly on bank 
financing, as is the case in the euro area.23 In this context, countries such as Italy and 
Greece registered a sharp rise of NPLs and large losses among national banks.24 The 
Italian banking sector reported an outstanding stock of €151 billion of net NPLs (and 
EUR 324 billion of gross NPLs) mostly accumulated during the financial and sovereign 
debt crisis.25 The deterioration of past-due loans has been accompanied by the negative 
performance of some Italian banks’ portfolio such as Unicredit, Banca Monte dei Paschi 
di Siena, Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca.26 The non-performing assets 
have triggered a sell-off of shares in these banks (halving their value) on concerns about 
their huge exposure to NPLs, resulting in low profitability.27 The IMF considers the 
turmoil of Italian banks to be among the leading potential risks to global growth. 
                     
22 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recommends banks not to use forbearance practices to 
avoid classifying loans as non-performing. 
23 See International Monetary Fund, ‘A Strategy for Resolving Europe’s Problem Loans’, (2015), Staff 
Discussion Note, SDN/15/19 9, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1519.pdf. 
24 See EBA, ‘Risk Dashboard. Data as of Q4 2016’, (2017), 30, available at: 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1804996/EBA+Dashboard+-+Q4+2016.pdf/74c92eb4-
3083-47fc-bd5d-6a8ac64e8393. 
25 See Bank of Italy, ‘Financial Stability Report’, November 2017, n. 2, 25. It is underlined that the 
coverage ratio—provisions in relation to the whole stock of NPLs—reached 53.5 per cent. 
26 Ibid, 18. 
27 On December 2016, the Italian government passed the Law Decree No 237/2016—converted into 
Law No 15/2017. The Law Decree No 237 of 2016 ‘Urgent measures for the protection of savings in 
the banking sector’ provides guarantees for the public support of banks under liquidity and capital 
stress scenario. The Decree provides public financial assistance to manage banking crises and consists 
of liquidity support measures and public recapitalization measures. Liquidity measures are guarantees 
granted by the State on liabilities issued after the decree law’s entry into force, aiming to facilitate the 
bank’s ability to restore its own viability. The Law Decree requires that only shareholders and holders 
of hybrid and subordinated bank bonds are involved in the burden sharing, the main aim is to avoid the 
involvement of the bank’s non-subordinated creditors under the bail-in rules. Bank’s shareholders 
accept (1) the dilution of their shares following the State’s intervention; and (2) the conversion into 
equity of the subordinated bonds. Holders of hybrid and subordinated instruments accept the 
conversion into equity of these instruments, in whole or in part, as necessary. In addition, the Law 
Decree establishes a compensation mechanism to protect retail investors who will receive new shares 
following the burden sharing. Under the Law Decree, the access to public support is limited to banks 
that are not failing or likely to fail, but to banks that need to strengthen capital in case of the crisis or 
adverse scenario. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) may intervene to purchase these shares 
and in exchange, investors will receive ordinary bonds from the bank (issued at par by the bank or a 
company that is part of the same group) for a value equal to the amount paid by the MEF for the 
purchase of the shares. The compensation scheme can be accessed under limited circumstances: (1) 
compensation may only be provided to retail investors, not qualified or professional investors; and (2) 
the MEF may intervene in support of a settlement agreement between a bank and these investors to 
avoid or resolve a dispute concerning the selling of converted instruments. 
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Jassaud and Kang have estimated that the NPL ratio in Italy in 2014 was 17 percent of 
all loans.28 High percentages of NPLs reduce profitability, increase funding costs and tie 
up bank capital, which negatively impact credit supply and ultimately growth.29 
Addressing the rise of NPLs has become a key concern for the EU banking system and 
the supervision of NPLs requires comprehensive action to deal with these types of bad 
loans sitting on banks’ books.30  
 
2.1 The treatment of loan loss provisioning 
The initiatives to harmonize NPL definition and asset classification for purposes of loan 
loss provisioning (LLP) require considerable monitoring of the prudential regulator: the 
quality of the data for the purpose of assessing loans in distress represents the main 
question for bank supervisors.31 The debate about the link between LLP and bank 
capitalization shows the relevance of provisioning powers to ensure that loans are 
capital-neutral. The conventional view – and the rationale for imposing capital 
requirements on banks – is that LLPs and related capital deductions are meant to 
support banks deal with expected losses from their lending business, while bank capital 
is meant to provide buffers for unexpected losses.32  
While higher ex-ante provisioning against expected loan losses lowers bank profitability 
in the short term, over the long term the progressive constitution of LLPs in good times 
reduces the chances of having a situation in crisis times where ex-post NPL losses force 
a bank to raise capital. Borio et al.33 and Laeven and Majnoni34 argued that LLPs need 
to be an integral component of banking regulation because they act as forward-looking 
provisioning and timely recognition of loss. The key economic consequence of 
                     
28 See Nadege Jassaud & Kenneth Kang, ‘A Strategy for Developing a Market for Nonperforming 
Loans in Italy’, (2015), IMF Working Paper No. 15-24. Jassaud and Kang also cite a lack of tax rebates 
on losses in Italy, and that the current accounting standard in Europe (IAS 39) is not explicit on exactly 
when and how to write off uncollectible loans. 
29 Ibid, 10. 
30 See Bholat et al, supra note 8, 9. 
31 See Mark Wahrenburg, ‘Provisioning policies for non-performing loans: How to best ensure a “clean 
balance sheet”?’, (2017), White Paper Series, No. 51, 5-6, available at 
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/171930.  
32 See paras 12, 13 and 17 in the Basel II agreement that indicate the methodology of computation of 
LLPs: current accounting under IFRS and US GAAP requires LLPs to reflect incurred losses that 
means losses that a bank estimates it has already suffered on a loan, instead of the future losses it 
expects to suffer.   
33 See Claudio Borio, Craig Furfine & Philip Lowe, ‘Procyclicality of the financial system and 
financial stability: issues and policy options’, (2001), BIS papers 1, 1-2. 
34 See Luc Laeven & Giovanni Majnoni, ‘Loan loss provisioning and economic slowdowns: too much, 
too late?’, (2003), 12(2) Journal of Financial Intermediation, 178-9. 
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insufficient LLP and the persistence of NPLs on bank balance sheets is the combined 
threat of a ‘capital crunch’ and a ‘credit crunch.’ In this context, the Japanese ‘lost 
decades’ and the recent global financial crisis provide valid cases.35 
 
3. The SSM and the role of ECB 
The EBU has favoured the centralization of bank supervision and resolution: this 
architecture within its respective mandate should be able to efficiently deal with the 
proliferation of cross-border banking and any possible negative implications. The ECB 
is the competent authority responsible for supervising (significant) credit institutions 
established in the Euro area, while NPL of non-credit institutions are supervised by 
other authorities, namely the European Commission, the EBA and the National 
Competent Authorities. The SSM has introduced a set of supervisory tools to assess the 
banks’ balance sheet through on site-inspections, stress test and asset quality reviews.36 
The ECB established a prudential regime to strengthen the capital rules and banking 
supervision since NPLs represent the major systemic threat that they are facing as they 
may rapidly lead to bank and borrower insolvencies.37 In terms of supervisory powers, 
Article 16(2) of the SSM Regulation provides that the ECB can apply ‘specific 
                     
35 See Ricardo J. Caballero, Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, ‘Zombie lending and depressed 
restructuring in Japan’, (2008), 98(5) American Economic Review, 1943-44. 
36 See ECB, ‘Stocktake of national supervisory practices and legal frameworks related to NPLs’, 
(2017), 3-4,  
available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.stock_taking2017.en.pdf. 
Stress tests are indicators that assess the financial stability of banks. The test examines the three-year 
period following a recent reference date and includes a baseline macroeconomic scenario together with 
the adverse scenario, which assumes the impact of one or more particularly severe shocks. The 
European stress tests are coordinated by the EBA that regulates the stress test exercise under the direct 
supervision of ECB. The stress test is designed as an informative element relevant for the supervision 
process. The results will then be used by the competent authorities to assess the capacity of a bank to 
meet the regulatory requirements in stressed scenarios on the basis of common methodologies and 
assumptions. 
37 The question of asset quality classification has become prominent since the divergence in practice 
between firms and regulators in defining “non-performing” has hampered the need for NPL 
harmonization. Within the NPL category are comprised: (1) bad loans; (2) default loans; and (3) 
distressed debt. The classification depends on several factors and varies across jurisdictions. In some 
countries, nonperforming means that the loan is impaired while in others can mean that payments are 
past due. Nevertheless, a rather common feature of nonperforming loans appears to be that a payment 
is “more than 90 days” past due, especially for retail loans’. The classification of the loan as non-
performing by the bank and when the loan becomes “bad debt” depends on domestic regulations. 
Further, the rising discrepancy between banks’ overdue loan ratios and NPL ratios makes difficult to 
identify deteriorated loans that are not formally classified as nonperforming. This problem is 
particularly evident in the Chinese banks where the fragility of loan loss provisions does not help to 
mitigate the NPL classification issue. See Yuan Yang, ‘China banks in stand-off with regulators on 
loan loss provisions’, Financial Times, London, 30 October 2016.  
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provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements’38. These 
supervisory actions consist in requiring credit institutions (1) to hold additional layers of 
funds in excess of the capital requirements to cover unexpected losses; (2) to set 
strategies and internal mechanisms to foster compliance with supervisory requirements; 
(3) to implement specific provisioning policy to reduce excessive exposures and 
systemic risk transactions; and (4) to enhance information disclosure on remuneration 
policies, profits distribution and liquidity requirements. 
In March 2017 the ECB produced a qualitative guidance on non-performing loans, 
including consideration of how the ‘unlikely to pay’ criterion should be applied in 
practice, and how banks should manage and monitor forbearance, write offs and 
collateral valuation.39 This supervisory toolkit aims to address the issue of identification 
and allocation of deteriorated loans in the EU banking sector.40  
The ECB clearly stated in the guidance on NPLs that the priority is to develop 
workout units and private debt restructuring agreements to write-off bad loans from the 
bank balance sheet.41 This should stop Member States to provide financial assistance in 
support of their banks to cover unexpected losses due by failures to repay on time 
certain business transactions.42 The NPL guidelines are not intended to introduce 
standards on resolution scenarios, but rather on the solution of NPL problems in SSM 
banks well ahead of the failing or likely to fail threshold. These provisions are directed 
to implement a prudential supervisory regime of NPLs through best practices such as 
operational plans and internal controls to prevent the risk of asset deterioration. As 
indicated in the guidance, ‘the key objective of granting forbearance measures is to pave 
the way for nonperforming borrowers to exit their non-performing status, or to prevent 
                     
38 See Article 16(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, supra note 1. 
39 See ECB, ‘Guidance to banks on non-performing loans’, (2017), 49-50, available at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/guidance_on_npl.en.pdf. 
40 It can be noted that in the south of the European Continent, the European Bank Coordination ‘Vienna 
Initiative’—a private-public sector forum which brings together international financial institutions, 
international organizations, public authorities and private banks—has launched various proposals to 
address NPLs in CESEE countries. The main purpose is to create a platform of coordination and 
cooperation for Western banks to enhance enforcement measures, improving consistency in the 
definition of NPLs and removing legal obstacles and execution issues in distressed transactions. 
Specifically, the ‘Vienna Initiative’ has adopted a set of principles for monitoring and preventing the 
deterioration of assets.  
41 See ECB, supra note 36, 19-20. 
42 See the controversial cases of State aid of Alpha Bank, Eurobank and Piraeus Bank in European 
Commission, ‘State aid: Commission approves amended restructuring plans for Alpha Bank and 
Eurobank’ IP/15/6184, 26 November 2015; and, ‘State aid: Commission approves aid for Piraeus Bank 
on the basis of an amended restructuring plan’, (2015), IP/15/6193. 
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performing borrowers from reaching a non-performing status’.43 The guidance aims to 
harmonize private mechanisms to resolve troubled banks through the mandatory 
implementation of the NPL guidance into the complex system of banking resolution.44  
The NPL guidance has been further developed in the prudential treatment for 
distressed loans through supervisory expectations on the classification of NPEs.45 The 
ECB’s supervisory expectations supplement the NPL guidance by specifying the 
regulatory actions when assessing a bank’s levels of prudential provisions for NPEs. 
Specifically, the ECB will assess banks’ practices and report any divergences with the 
prudential provisioning expectations: banks are required to maintain their level of 
monitoring in line with the prudential expectations. Supervisory expectations on secured 
exposures – that benefit from credit risk protection – apply after seven years from the 
date on which they have been classified non-performing (e.g. “vintage period”). 
Supervisory expectations on unsecured exposures – that do not benefit from credit risk 
protection – apply after two years from the date on which they have been defined as 
“vintage”. The ECB is responsible to assess the exposure level of assets and disclose 
information in a continue supervisory dialogue, taking into account ‘a linear path 
starting from year three onwards’.46 It can be noted that the ECB’s supervisory 
expectations are directed to monitor the lifecycle of NPEs with limited provision 
coverage, and they apply only to new NPLs as of April 2018.47 The NPL guidance 
represents a welcome improvement in the regulatory framework of asset classification 
since with the advent of the EBU the ECB is in charge of the supervision of significant 
credit institutions.   
 
3.1 The ECB prudential regime on NPEs  
The implementation of bank’s levels of prudential provisions for NPEs has raised 
particular attention in the monitoring practices of the ECB: the new regulatory tools to 
                     
43 See ECB, supra note 36, 39. 
44 However, the guidelines are soft law recommendations—not binding and not enforceable—and leave 
discretion to national authorities to implement them at the domestic level. 
45 See ECB, ‘Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks on nonperforming loans: Prudential 
provisioning backstop for non-performing exposures’, (2018), 2, available at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.npl_addendum_201803.en.pdf. 
46 Ibid, 11, where it is stated that ‘the ECB considers that prudent provisioning implies the continuation 
of booking accounting provisions in line with banks’ assessments and existing accounting principles’. 
47 The addendum clarifies that ‘“new NPEs” are all those exposures that are reclassified from 
performing to non-performing in line with the EBA’s definition after 1 April 2018, irrespective of their 
classification at any moment prior to that date’. See ECB, supra note 45, 7. 
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oversight “vintage” NPLs and related collateral seek to intensify standardization and 
supervisory convergence. On this view, the ECB risk-reduction measures on NPEs aim 
to reduce national supervisory discretion and heterogeneity on loan classification. It can 
be observed that the prudential provisioning expectations complement the ‘Guidelines 
on supervisory review and evaluation process’ (SREP) set by the EBA to oversight the 
asset quality and capital coverage of banks.48 It is worth mentioning that the SREP 
framework provides recommendations on how to assess the components of risk profile 
of the credit institutions, namely internal governance, liquidity requirements and capital 
adequacy ratio. This supervisory process is designed to identify common methodologies 
for restoring the viability of banks in crisis. The EBA Guidelines indicate operating 
models and management strategies to evaluate the risks of individual banks. 
Specifically the SREP regime provides key indicators for the monitoring of institutions 
such as: (1) the business model analysis; (2) the assessment of internal governance and 
institution-wide controls; (3) the assessment of risks to capital (i.e. capital adequacy 
evaluation); and (4) assessment of risks to liquidity and funding (i.e. liquidity adequacy 
evaluation).49 According to the SREP assessment, competent authorities identify the 
vulnerability of banks’ balance sheet through quantitative capital measures, quantitative 
liquidity measures and other supervisory measures including early intervention. These 
methodologies apply to banking activities and risks in a forward-looking manner to 
reflect stronger correlation between risk profile of institutions and capital 
requirements.50 In the SREP criteria, particular relevance is placed on the assessment of 
the portfolio credit quality that set the oversight of forborne and NPEs. Competent 
authorities are responsible to monitor the non-performing rates, the distribution of the 
exposures, the foreclosed assets and the “vintage” NPL portfolio.51 The business models 
and credit risk indicators of the SREP respond to the regulatory instances of timely 
classification of non-performing assets. It can be argued that the SREP process is a 
valuable indicator for understanding the internal management of credit institutions since 
‘the SREP sets out where a bank stands in terms of capital requirements and the way it 
                     
48 See EBA, ‘Guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and 
evaluation process (SREP)’, EBA/GL/2014/13, 19 December 2014, available at 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/935249/EBA-GL-2014-
13+(Guidelines+on+SREP+methodologies+and+processes).pdf. 
49 Ibid, 21. 
50 See ECB, ‘SSM SREP  Methodology Booklet’, 2017 edn, 46, available at http://financial-
stability.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2016-3_ecb_ssm-srep-methodology-booklet.pdf.  
51 See EBA, supra note 48, 71. 
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deals with risks’.52 In this context, the ECB prudential regime on NPEs – developed 
with the supervisory expectations on “vintage” NPLs – can have a positive impact on 
the SREP in terms of coordination among various risk-reduction measures. It is evident 
that these reforms aim to avoid discrepancies across supervisory actions and foster 
operational harmonization in the Banking Union.53 As noted, ‘the effort to harmonize 
NPL definitions and provisioning rules needs to be complemented by intrusive 
supervision, including regular independent asset quality reviews, effective usage of 
supervisory powers to ensure adequate provisioning and write-off for outstanding 
NPLs’.54 On this view, the ECB’s supervisory expectations seem the way forward to 
achieve sound level of credit protection for the non-performing exposures. This 
continued strengthening of prudential regulation will have significant effect for 
supervisory convergence and bank stability. However the standardization process of 
NPLs treatment will require supervisors to maintain ongoing dialogue among competent 
authorities and ensure greater operational harmonization.  
 
4. The supervisory actions of EBA and accounting standards 
The fact that the ECB shall also take into account the supervisory action of the EBA 
can be considered a convergent regulatory response to the issue of the reporting of non-
performing loans and forbearance.55 The EBA document standardizes the definition of 
“exposure”, “non-performing exposures” and “forborne exposures”.56 The EBA 
standards define non-performing as loan of either 90 days past due, or where the debtor 
is unlikely to pay its credit obligations in full. The European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) has noted that disclosures about forbearance practices in the 
financial statements diverged significantly and were often limited in the amount of 
information provided and vague as to content.57 In this context, the EBA has published 
                     
52 See Edouard Fernandez-Bollo, ‘Inside Perspective: The ACPR’s View on the Operational 
Functioning of the Banking Union’, (2017), 18(3) European Business Organization Law Review, 428.  
53 See Laura Noonan, ‘ECB finds big differences in how eurozone deals with NPLs’, Financial Times, 
London, 12 September 2016.  
54 See Nadege Jassaud & Edouard Vidon, ‘European NPLs through the crisis: A policy review’, (2017), 
25(4) Journal of Financial Regulation & Compliance, 420. 
55 See EBA, supra note 19. 
56 Ibid, para 149, which states that for the purpose of template 18, “exposures” include all debt 
instruments (loans, advances and debt securities) and off-balance sheet exposures (loan commitments, 
financial guarantees and other revocable and irrevocable commitments) excluding trading exposures 
and off balance sheet exposures except held for trading exposures.  
57 See ESMA, ‘Treatment of Forbearance Practices in IFRS Financial Statements of Financial 
Institutions’, (2012), ESMA/2012/853,  
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a set of guidelines on banks’ credit risk management implementing the accounting 
standard for expected credit losses and the prudential requirements for NPLs.58  
Following the 2007-09 global crisis, the G20 called for accounting standard setters 
to “strengthen accounting recognition of loan-loss provisions by incorporating a broader 
range of credit information”.59 The FSB echoed the G20 recommendations encouraging 
standards that “will incorporate a broader range of available credit information than 
existing provisioning requirements, so as to recognise credit losses in loan portfolios at 
an earlier stage”.60 Under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and 
the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) impairment was only recognized 
when a loss event had occurred.  
During the financial crisis banks often did not disclose the level of write offs, 
situations where both a loan and the related provision are derecognized from the balance 
sheet because there is no realistic prospect of recovery. The assessment of whether a 
write-off is required inevitably involves judgement on the part of the bank, and so it 
follows that one bank might elect to write off an asset where another bank would not, 
even when the underlying economics are broadly similar. In terms of asset quality, 
provisions and write offs, regulatory definitions are divergent.  
Under the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) approach, the forward-
looking provision is set at 12 months of expected loss for all loans, and full expected 
loss over the lifetime of a loan where ‘significant increase in credit risk’ has occurred. 
When determining whether such credit deterioration has taken place, the accounting 
guidance makes reference to an internal credit downgrade as an indicator, thus assuming 
that an internal credit classification might exist. The debate on accounting standards 
sheds light on the different views between securities and banking regulators about the 
appropriate allowance for managerial judgement and discretion in the estimation of 
future losses.61  
                     
available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2012-853.pdf. 
58 See EBA, ‘Guidelines on credit institutions’ credit risk management practices 
and accounting for expected credit losses’, (2017), Final Report EBA/GL/2017/06 available at 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1842525/Final+Guidelines+on+Accounting+for+Expecte
d+Credit+Losses+%28EBA-GL-2017-06%29.pdf. 
59 See G20 Research Group, ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System’, (2009) Global Plan 
Annex, available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.pdf. 
60 See Financial Stability Board, ‘Improving Financial Regulation’, (2009), Report of the Financial 
Stability Board to G20 Leaders, available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_090925b.pdf. 
61 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel 3: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems’, (2011), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. This 
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Banking regulators argue that early provisioning provides a buffer against potential 
future losses.62 On the other hand, securities regulators have been wary of banks raising 
high provisions and then releasing them as a means of artificially smoothing profits in 
order to reduce the volatility of their stock market valuations, a typical approach of the 
‘incurred loss’ model.63 It can be observed that the steps being taken post crisis, to bring 
in greater forward looking LLPs, will increasingly integrate the accounting standards on 
provisioning with information useful to prudential regulators in assessing capital 
adequacy requirements. 
 
5. Restructuring and resolution options for NPLs recovery beyond the SSM 
The ECB NPL policy is alone non-sufficient to reduce NPLs but other measures are 
needed. Various proposals to restructure NPLs have been advanced, namely individual 
bank restructurings, bank-internal bad-bank units and bank-specific asset management 
companies (AMCs).64 Enria suggested establishing an AMC with government support 
to resolve NPLs selling the assets at their economic value.65 Avgouleas and Goodhart 
proposed a new structure for a Pan-European “bad bank” with virtually ringfenced 
country subsidiaries to ensure burden sharing without debt mutualisation.66 This 
proposal has been echoed in the 2018 Commission blueprint on national AMC67: the 
document provides non-binding principles to guide Member States in the 
implementation of AMCs at the domestic level. These principles highlight the role of 
AMC in removing troubled assets from banks’ balance sheets and restructuring banks 
                     
document has been revised by the paper ‘Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms’, (2017), available at 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf.  
62 See Kees Camfferman, ‘The Emergence of the ‘Incurred-Loss’ Model for Credit Losses in IAS 39’, 
(2015), 12 Accounting in Europe, 2. 
63 See Anne Beatty & Scott Liao, ‘Do delays in expected loss recognition affect banks’ willingness to 
lend?’, (2011), 52 Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1-2. 
64 See Patrizia Baudino & Hyuncheol Yun, ‘Resolution of non-performing loans – policy options’, 
(2017), FSI Insights on policy implementation No, 3 3-4, available at 
https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights3.pdf.   
65 See Andrea Enria, ‘The EU banking sector - risks and recovery. A single market perspective’, 
Luxembourg, (2017), 16, available at https://www.esm.europa.eu/speeches-and-presentations/esm-
seminar-andrea-enria-eba-chairperson. 
66 See Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, ‘Utilizing AMCs to tackle Eurozone’s legacy non 
performing loans’, (2017), European Economy Banks, Regulation, and the Real Sector, 103-4, 
available at http://european-economy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/EE_1.2017.pdf.  
67 See European Commission, ‘AMC Blueprint. Accompanying the document Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Central 
Bank. Second Progress Report on the Reduction of Non-Performing Loans in Europe’, Commission 
Staff Working Document, Brussels, SWD(2018) 72 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/policy/180314-staff-working-document-non-performing-loans_en.pdf. 
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with high levels of NPLs. It is stated that ‘AMCs can be private or (partly) publicly 
funded without State aid, if the State can be considered to act as any other economic 
agent’.68 The blueprint underlines the need to complement the AMCs with the State aid 
rules, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism regime to create a common level playing field of rules on NPLs resolving 
mechanism. 
The distressed loans problem implies allocating losses within the system, 
particularly losses that should be borne either by banks’ customers, banks themselves, 
investors or States.69 The fact that there is no universal definition of NPL – as a sum of 
borrowed money upon which the debtor has not made his or her scheduled payments for 
at least 90 days – creates difficulty to assess the viable option to restructure deteriorated 
assets.70 The available options for NPLs recovery are currently work in progress and 
need to be fully tested.71 In this context, NPL provisioning treatment is still not 
sufficient in the absence of harmonized deposit insurance. It can be noted that State 
level deposit insurers are not viable inside a monetary union because the liquidation of 
small banks could overwhelm the capacity of national deposit insurance. Mutualization 
of deposit insurance requires full harmonization of insolvency laws because the 
effectiveness of the bank liquidation process will have an impact on the financial 
situation of the deposit insurance over which insured depositors have a legal claim.  
Converging towards a harmonized approach on recovery and resolution plans for 
NPLs is the question at stake.72 As observed, ‘given that the barriers to cross-border 
banking are likely to fall, the EU should consider what sort of banking structure would 
provide the best combination of an integrated financial system and a financial system in 
which the banks are neither too large to supervise nor too large to safely fail’.73 This 
means that EU rules will have impact on where banks shed operations due to cost 
                     
68 Ibid, 4.  
69 See Benoit Mesnard, Alienor Anne Claire Duvillet-Margerit, Cairen Power & Marcel Magnus, ‘Non-
performing loans in the Banking Union: stocktaking and challenges’, (2016), European Parliament, 4, 
available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/574400/IPOL_BRI(2016)574400_EN.pdf 
70 See Luis Cortavarria, Claudia Dziobek, Akihiro Kanaya & Inwon Song, ‘Loan Review, 
Provisioning, and Macroeconomic Linkages’, (2000), IMF Working Paper No. 00/195, 11-12. 
71 See Faidon Kalfaoglou, ‘NPLs resolution regimes: Challenges for regulatory authorities’ (2018), 
11(2), Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 175-6. 
72 See Vitor Constâncio, ‘Resolving Europe’s NPL burden: challenges and benefits’, Keynote speech at 
the event ‘Tackling Europe’s non-performing loans crisis: restructuring debt, reviving growth’, (2017), 
available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170203.en.html. 
73 See Nieto and Wall, supra note 3, 21. 
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factors of maintaining operations and risk will likely migrate to less regulated local 
entities in a risk race to bottom. Barriers to the resolution of problem loans such as legal 
or economic impediments to collateral realization may also result in the inability or 
unwillingness of banks to write loans off in a timely manner. This can result in a higher 
number of highly-provisioned loans remaining on these banks’ balance sheets. 
An example of effective and timely resolution options for NPLs is found in the 
Italian piece of legislation (Law No 132/2015)74, amending the procedures for firms’ 
liquidation and restructuring of assets. This new law aims to increase the speed and 
efficiency of insolvency procedures and property foreclosures, and to promote higher 
recovery rates for creditors. Another legislative initiative concerning NPLs recovery 
(i.e. non-possessory pledge and foreclosure of collateral) has been launched with the 
Italian insolvency law reform of 2016.75 The legal framework introduced the possibility 
to set private enforcement clauses in loan contracts with firms, allowing creditors to 
take ownership of collateral out-of-court in case of a debtor’s default.76   
The out-of-court enforcement procedures for secured loans granted to enterprises 
amend the “pactum marcianum”, according to which the creditor takes over or dispose 
the collateral but needs to compensate the debtor for any excess value of the collateral 
once the loan is satisfied.77 The new enforcement rules should reduce the court 
involvement and speed up the process of collecting bad assets: this would ease the 
agreement among creditors and enhance the marketability of NPLs.78 The law 
introduces provisions to facilitate access to finance for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) enabling entrepreneurs to pledge movable assets while continuing to 
                     
74 See Italian Law No 132/2015 published in Italian OJ No 192 of 20 August 2015 that converted the 
Law Decree No 83/2015 published in Italian OJ No 147 of 27 June 2015 available at: 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazion
eGazzetta=2015-08-
20&atto.codiceRedazionale=15G00136&isAnonimo=false&normativi=true&tipoVigenza=originario&
tipoSerie=serie_generale&currentPage=1. 
75 See Italian Law Decree No 59/2016 converted into Italian Law No 119/2016. 
76 See European Commission, ‘Italy – Review of progress on policy measures relevant for the 
correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances’, (2016), 13, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/italy-
review-progress-policy-measures-relevant-correction-macroeconomic-imbalances-december-2016_en. 
77 See José Garrido, ‘Insolvency and Enforcement Reforms in Italy’, (2016) IMF Working Papers, 8, 
available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16134.pdf. 
78 The Italian Insolvency law provides both in-court and out-of-court restructuring tools. See Monica 
Marcucci, Alessandra Pischedda & Vincenza Profeta, ‘The changes of the Italian insolvency and 
foreclosure regulation adopted in 2015’, (2015), Bank of Italy notes on Financial Stability and 
Supervision No. 2, 2. As observed, ‘faster and more efficient insolvency and foreclosure procedures 
will have a twofold effect on the stock of NPLs. In the short term, they should reduce the discount 
required by NPL buyers, with positive effects on NPL prices and on the perspective of development of 
a market for these assets’. 
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use them, and to enforce new non-possessory security interests over movable assets. 
The main aim of these provisions is to enhance out-of-court restructuring agreements in 
view of a timely resolution of firm’s crisis. This mechanism reflects the UK company 
law procedure of “scheme of arrangement” that allows the English court to sanction and 
give effect to an arrangement between a company and a class or classes of its creditors 
(or its shareholders).79  
The Italian out-of-court proceeding allows creditors of a firm that has filed for 
“concordato preventivo” to submit the restructuring plans in competition with the one 
presented by the firm.80 These reforms can be considered a step forward in the 
resolution options to address bad loans, particularly in protecting creditors’ interests to 
invest in distressed debts of viable firms and to pursue higher recovery rates. The rules 
on non-possessory pledge and foreclosure of collateral can have a systemic impact in 
the restructuring of troubled banks as they can create legal certainty and confidence in 
the process of divesting NPLs portfolio. As noted by the ECB, ‘the Italian supervisory 
regulation for NPLs is mainly principles-based with regard to the guidelines issued to 
banks on NPLs management practices’.81 On this view, the Italian government 
introduced a mechanism of double guarantees: the guarantee to collateralize liabilities 
and sell the senior tranches under the State backed-scheme ‘GACS’82, and the guarantee 
                     
79 English Companies Act 2006, part 26 regulates the procedure of scheme of arrangement. The 
English court can order that the terms of the scheme agreed by the requisite majority of a scheme class 
are binding on all the members of that scheme class. In other words, the requisite majority, with the 
English court’s approval, can bind the minority into the amendments or compromise of those scheme 
class creditors’ rights. The English legislation does not prescribe the terms or scope of the compromise 
or arrangement. An English scheme can be used to cut through documentary restrictions or voting 
majorities or thresholds under the documents in question, including when the contractual terms state 
that unanimous support is necessary. See, inter alia, Jennifer Payne, Schemes of arrangement. Theory, 
Structure and Operation (Cambridge University Press 2014), 1-2. 
80 Prior to the law reform, a firm filing for ‘concordato preventivo’ had the exclusive authority to 
submit a restructuring plan. The ‘concordato preventivo’ is an alternative procedure of the liquidation 
of enterprises, it allows creditors to participate actively in the sale of assets and, overall, in the 
reorganization process. 
81 See ECB, ‘Stocktake of national supervisory practices and legal frameworks related to NPLs’, 
September 2016, 87, available at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/npl/stock_taking.en.pdf. 
82 The Guarantee on Securitization of Bank Non Performing Loans (GACS) introduced by Italian Law 
Decree No 18/2016 (converted into Law No 49/2016) is an aid-free scheme aiming to assist Italian 
banks in securitizing and moving NPLs off their balance sheets. Basically, it is a State guarantee 
scheme open to all banks on a voluntary basis. The State guarantee consists in remunerating the senior 
notes at market terms according to the risk taken, i.e. in a manner acceptable for a private operator 
under market conditions. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) can issue a GACS guarantee to 
secure the payment obligations of Italian Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) in relation to senior tranches 
of asset-backed notes issued by the SPVs within the securitization transactions of NPLs according to 
the Italian securitization law No 130/1999. It can be observed that Italian Law No 49/2016 allows for 
the provision of State guarantees for NPLs securitization transactions that would contribute to alleviate 
the pressure on banks’ balance sheets. 
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to inject capital by purchasing shares. The State provides a double securitization: (1) on 
the credit enhancement of senior notes; and (2) on the collateralized losses of the junior 
bondholders.83 In other words, the government guarantee should favour the coverage of 
gap between the net book value and the market value of the NPLs with the aim to 
improve the trade of bad loans.  
The solution adopted by the Italian regulatory authorities to address the NPLs issue 
is an improvement of the current legislative framework even if the guarantees 
mechanism seems an accounting makeup – as the losses cannot disappear – rather than a 
full definition of problems. The European Commission stated that ‘the State guarantee 
on the senior tranche will only become effective, if at least more than half of the non-
guaranteed and risk-bearing junior tranche has been successfully sold to private market 
participants’.84 The GACS system to resolve NPLs raises complex challenges linked to 
the market conditions: a restructuring mechanism that reflects a regulatory compromise 
where the guarantees could be activated at the expenses of taxpayers’ money.  
In this context, the EU Commission published a proposal for a directive on 
minimum procedures for out-of-court settlement regarding NPLs.85 This new proposal 
links the various supervisory initiatives taken by the SSM and EBA in addressing the 
NPLs issue. In managing NPLs, the proposal aims (1) to foster the debt recovery 
procedures through the implementation of a distinct common accelerated extrajudicial 
collateral enforcement procedure; and (2) to create secondary markets for NPLs. The 
overall objective is to reduce the burden of NPLs in the banks’ balance sheet by 
introducing efficient out-of-court procedures to recover value from collateral and to 
lower the costs for resolving NPLs making them more competitive in the market.86  
For resolution tools to work in practice, there needs to be a better understanding of 
what assets are worth in a crisis situation, and therefore of asset quality more generally. 
Adequate provisioning for NPLs requires overcoming complex strategic incentives that 
                     
83 It can be noted that Italian law does not require the consent of the borrower for the sale of a loan, 
only the notification of the borrower. Article 58 of the Italian Banking Act (No 385/93) provides an 
exemption from the obligation to notify each debtor in the case of a bulk loan sale. 
84 See European Commission, ‘State aid: Commission approves impaired asset management measures 
for banks in Hungary and Italy’, IP/16/279, 10 February 2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-279_en.htm. 
85 See European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral’, Brussels, COM(2018) 135 final, 
available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/com-2018-135_en. 
86 See Alexander Lehmann, ‘Risk reduction through Europe’s distressed debt market’, Bruegel Policy 
Contribution, Issue n. 02, 18 January 2018, 5-6, available at http://bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/PC-02_2018-100118.pdf. 
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banks have in either wanting to keep LLPs low, or for not writing NPLs off from their 
balance sheets. The timing of losses taken as a result of provisions or write offs and the 
level of LLPs set aside for future NPLs on the balance sheet are often part of a bank’s 
strategy to smooth reported earnings and reported capitalization.87  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
NPLs constitute a real concern to the banking sector. They can produce a serious 
impact in the systemic credit institutions and in the fragile financial firms. To strengthen 
the balance sheet of banks non-performing exposures have to be restructured, something 
that regulators are not always ready to implement. To reduce the likelihood of 
authorities’ intervention and increase the role of creditors, the process of resolution and 
restructuring of NPLs represents the potential challenges investors and policy makers 
may face.88 The growing of deteriorated loans poses an instance where the workings of 
the SSM and the supervisory regime of ECB have been put to the test. Moreover, the 
NPLs demonstrated that banks rely on government rescues and bailout programmes89 
and it is difficult to predict a full implementation of the prudential treatment for asset 
classification. It can be argued that the ECB’s supervisory practices are directed to 
strengthen the harmonization process of bank supervision and create sound prudential 
environment on NPLs with the Banking Union.  
                     
87 See Paul Beck & Ganapathi Narayanamoorthy, ‘Did the SEC impact banks’ loan loss reserve 
policies and their informativeness?’, (2013), 56 Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42. See also 
Iftekhar Hasan & Larry D. Wall, ‘Determinants of the Loan Loss Allowance: Some Cross-Country 
Comparisons’, (2004), 39 Financial Review, 129-130. 
88 See Moody’s, Moody’s Investors Service, ‘Rated Bank Defaults and Government Support During 
the Crisis: A New Database and Study’, (2016), available at 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-publishes-a-study-of-bank-defaults-and-government-
support--
PR_353029?WT.mc_id=AM~RmluYW56ZW4ubmV0X1JTQl9SYXRpbmdzX05ld3NfTm9fVHJhbn
NsYXRpb25z~20160801_PR_353029. 
89 Benoit Mesnard, Marcel Magnus & Alienor Anne Claire Duvillet-Margerit, ‘The precautionary 
recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena’, (2017), European Parliament Briefing, 3, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/587392/IPOL_BRI(2017)587392_EN.pdf. 
See also Christos Gortsos, ‘Last resort lending to solvent credit institutions in the euro area before and 
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